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We investigate rewards to R&D in a model where substitute ideas for innovation arrive to random
recipients at random times. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves
an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas
may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We characterize
the welfare-maximizing reward structure when the social planner learns over time about the arrival
rate of ideas, and when private recipients of ideas can bank their ideas for future use. We argue that
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Rewards for R&D should depend on the underlying innovative process. We consider an
innovative environment where di⁄erent agents have substitute ideas for how to ￿ll a given
market niche. The purpose of the reward system is to choose among the substitute ideas.
Many models of R&D begin from a concept that opportunities are common knowledge
and eternally present, but progress can nevertheless be slow because R&D is costly and
resources are scarce.1 However, there is another reason that progress can be slow: Ideas
for investment are themselves scarce, not only from an individual￿ s point of view, but also
for society as a whole. Even if a market niche or economic need is known, there may be
considerable delay before someone realizes how to ￿ll it at reasonable cost. In addition to
the scarcity of resources, the scarcity of ideas is another constraint on progress.
In the innovative environment we study, investment opportunities are not common
knowledge. Ideas for how to ￿ll the market niche have random cost, and arrive at random
times to random individuals. If the recipient of an idea invests the cost, the idea becomes
an innovation that ￿lls the market niche. Most importantly, innovative environments are
distinguished by the arrival rate (scarcity) of ideas.
Our objective is to show how rewards should re￿ ect the scarcity of ideas. The social
planner does not know the ideas that have arrived, and does not know who received them. If
all ideas were available at the same time, the goal of the social planner would be to ￿nd the
minimum cost idea. However, that is not possible because the ideas arrive at random times.
The planner can weed out high-cost ideas by o⁄ering limited rewards, but he still faces a
trade-o⁄ between cost and delay. We characterize the reward structure that minimizes the
burden of these costs. In this reward structure,
￿ rewards increase with the scarcity of ideas;
￿ rewards increase with delay in ￿lling the market niche; and
1This is implicitly the premise of a large literature on patent races that builds on models surveyed by
Reinganum (1989).
1￿ the pro￿t on R&D investments will be positive in equilibrium due to the scarcity of
ideas.
These conclusions are tied to the notion that ideas are scarce, so that the reward policy
must mediate between cost and delay. Higher rewards reduce delay by encouraging invest-
ment in higher-cost ideas instead of waiting for lower-cost ideas. The ￿rst point states that
this is welfare-maximizing when ideas arrive at long intervals (￿ideas are scarce￿ ). The
second point arises when the scarcity (arrival rate) of ideas is unknown. As time passes
with no innovation, observers begin to think that the arrival rate of ideas is low. It becomes
even more attractive to tolerate higher cost in order to reduce delay. We do not know of
other papers where the reward policy changes dynamically.2
As in O￿ Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (OST, 1998) and Scotchmer (1999), our model
distinguishes between ideas and innovations. However, delay is never optimal in these
papers. OST (1998) address environments where the ideas are complements in the sense
that each idea builds on previous ideas, and Scotchmer (1999) addresses environments where
ideas serve di⁄erent market niches, but there are no substitute ideas for a given market niche.
In the model we discuss here, it is because ideas are substitutes that a certain amount of
delay should be tolerated. One of the ideas that arrives during the delay may have low cost.
Our model is a real options model in the spirit of MacDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). An investment is irreversible and could turn out to be a mistake. To
avoid mistakes, there is a value to delay. In many real options models, the value of the
option is internalized by the ￿rm. In our model, ideas (investment opportunities) accrue
to random ￿rms, which means that although waiting is valuable to society, the value of
waiting is not internalized by any potential innovator. The problem of the social planner is
to ensure that private recipients of ideas preserve socially valuable options.
2A dynamically changing reward policy would presumably be optimal in any model where learning takes
place about something relevant to rewards. Although the authors do not analyze this aspect, two papers
where that might be true are Choi (1991) and Malueg and Tsutsui (1997). In those papers, there is an
unknown parameter that governs the hazard rate of success in a production function for R&D that is
common knowledge among the ￿rms in a race. In our model below, the planner is learning about the hazard
rate at which the population as a whole receives ideas for investment. There is no commonly known but
uncertain production function for R&D.
2Our modeling apparatus is reminiscent of search models (see McCall and McCall, 2008),
although we do not interpret our random process as search. In search models, all opportu-
nities arrive to a single searcher who sets an optimal stopping policy. In our model, ideas
are so scarce that no individual is likely to receive more than one idea. The planner knows
that the population as a whole is receiving ideas, and knows something about the stochastic
process, but does not know who receives ideas or when. Nevertheless, the planner must set
the reward policy. Despite this fundamental di⁄erence, the planner￿ s reward policy in the
case of a known arrival rate is similar to the stopping rule that emerges in search models.
Although some search models involve learning, we do not know of results in the search
literature that are analogous to our results for the case that the planner is learning about
the arrival rate.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we set forth a simple model of scarce
ideas. In sections 3 and 4, we characterize the cost thresholds that maximize social welfare.
At each date, the cost threshold is a cost such that the possessor of a lower-cost idea should
invest. The planner realizes that if someone invests, society is giving up an option, namely,
the option to wait for a better idea. The option that is preserved by not investing is a social
option, not internalized by any potential investor.
The stochastic process that determines the option value depends on whether rejected
ideas are lost forever (￿use it or lose it￿ ) or banked for future use (￿use it or bank it￿ ).
We treat these two cases in sections 3 and 4. Banking is attractive to the social planner
when he does not know the arrival rate of ideas. As time passes, the planner becomes more
pessimistic about the arrival rate. An idea that seemed too costly a year ago will seem
more attractive at present because more delay is predicted. The planner will therefore want
access to the banked idea with lowest cost.
In section 5, we characterize how cost thresholds can be implemented, with and without
banking of ideas. The reward policy that implements a given cost threshold must account
for the strategic choices of idea recipients. Banking is attractive to the recipient of an idea
whenever the reward function is increasing. The recipient of the idea may be willing to
3forego the pro￿t available by investing at present in order to gamble on a higher reward in
the future. Of course, the recipient may be preempted in the meantime.
We conclude in section 6 by mentioning some ways that the reward policies described
in section 5 correspond to legal institutions.
2 A Model of Scarce Ideas
We assume there is market niche that may be ￿lled with an innovation. The social value of
￿lling the market niche is v=r, where r is the discount rate.
There is an exogenous process by which the potential innovators receive ideas for ￿lling
this market niche. To innovate, the inventor must ￿rst have an idea, which we interpret
as an act of imagination, and then have an incentive to invest in it. Each idea occurs at a
random time, to a random recipient. Each idea has associated to it an R&D cost that is
drawn independently from a common distribution F with support in [0;1) and density f.
To create an innovation, the recipient of an idea must invest the cost. We assume that the
ideas rain down on the population as a whole according to a Poisson process with parameter
￿, and we take the parameter ￿ as a measure of scarcity. If the hit rate ￿ is low, ideas are
scarce.
The recipient of an idea can invest in it, discard it, or bank it, which means to remember
it for future use. If the recipient of an idea invests in it, the process stops because the market
niche has been ￿lled. The reward policy will therefore operate by getting the population
of potential innovators to screen their ideas and then to discard or bank those with costs
that are too high. The value of the social option created by not investing is that another
idea might entail a lower cost. There is thus a social trade-o⁄ between cost and delay. The
policy objective is to manage this trade-o⁄ in a way that maximizes social welfare.
We assume that each agent receives at most one idea. This is an intentionally extreme
assumption that highlights the main premise of the paper. Ideas are scarce, not only for
society as a whole, but especially from the perspective of any individual.
The social policy is described by a threshold function c : R+ ! R+ such that the
4recipient of an idea at time t invests if the cost of the idea is less than c(t). A threshold
function is stationary if there exists ￿ c in R+ such that c(t) = ￿ c for all arrival times t. We
say an idea at time t is viable if it has cost less than c(t). The expected cost of a random







We say that the investment process survives to t if there is no viable idea before t:
We now consider two versions of the ideas process. In the ￿use it or lose it￿model, an
idea that is not used immediately is lost. For example, an idea may be lost or forgotten if
the recipient moves on to other projects. However, not all ideas will be lost, especially if
there is an incentive to remember them. We consider this in the ￿use it or bank it￿model.
The truth is probably somewhere between these two models for most R&D environments.
We study the two extreme cases in order to show their implications for the reward policy.
3 Use it or lose it
In this section, we assume that, if the recipient of an idea decides not to invest, the idea is
lost to everyone, including the recipient, and cannot be reclaimed later.
Let P (tj￿;c) be the probability of surviving to time t, as seen from time 0, when the
threshold function is c and the arrival rate of ideas is ￿: The survival probability P di⁄ers
according to whether ideas can be banked, but in both models, the probability distribution
on survival times is stochastically larger at smaller arrival rates.
When recipients either use their ideas or forget them immediately, the instantaneous
arrival rate of viable ideas at time t is ￿F (c(t)). As seen from time t = 0, the probability
of survival to time t with no viable idea is P (tj￿;c); de￿ned as follows.










(See, for example, Snyder and Miller, 1991, p. 51.) The probability of surviving to ^ t;




=P (tj￿;c): As seen from time t;


















We study both the case that the arrival rate ￿ is known, and the case that the arrival
rate is unknown. We now de￿ne a social welfare function that re￿ ects the tradeo⁄ between
cost and delay, and characterize the threshold function that maximizes it. We show for
the case when ￿ is known, that the threshold function is stationary, and further, that the
optimal stationary value decreases with the arrival rate of ideas, ￿:
Conditional on an arbitrary threshold function c; and assuming that no viable idea has
















































= V (t;c;￿) (5)
The left hand side is the net social value of investing in the threshold idea at time t. The
right hand side is the expected, discounted value of waiting for a better idea. If the left
hand side were greater than the right hand side, then social welfare could be improved by
increasing the threshold cost. If the right hand side were greater than the left hand side,
then social welfare could be increased by decreasing the threshold cost.
It is well known in the search literature that, because this is a stationary problem,
the optimal threshold is a stationary value, say ￿ c: Welfare as a function of the stationary
threshold ￿ c can be written as
￿ V (t;￿ c;￿) =
￿v
r
￿ EF (￿ c)
￿Z 1
t




￿ EF (￿ c)
￿ ￿F (￿ c)
￿F (￿ c) + r
(6)
6This expression shows the trade-o⁄ faced by the policy maker. If a higher stationary cost
threshold ￿ c is tolerated, the innovation will arrive sooner since the hit rate of viable ideas,
￿F (￿ c), is then higher, and the discounting expression,
￿F(￿ c)
(￿F(￿ c)+r), is larger.
Since the optimal threshold function is stationary, we can conceive of it as a value
c￿ (￿) 2 R+, where c(t) = c￿ (￿) for each t. The ￿rst-order condition for maximizing (6)







(￿F (c￿ (￿)) + r)
￿v
r
￿ EF (c￿ (￿))
￿
= 0. (7)
The (unique) solution c￿ (￿) has the property that investing in the marginal innovation
today, and receiving net value
￿v
r ￿ c￿ (￿)
￿
, is as valuable as waiting for the next viable
idea. The next viable idea will arrive with delay, but may have a lower cost. With a higher
arrival rate ￿, it makes sense to wait for a lower resource cost, because the time between
ideas is short.
We summarize these conclusions in the following proposition. Part (a) is proved in the
appendix in a di⁄erent way than in the search literature. Part (b) follows from di⁄erentiating
(7) implicitly.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the recipient of an idea must use it or lose it. Suppose that
the arrival rate of ideas, ￿, is ￿xed and known. Then (a) given ￿; the welfare-maximizing
cost threshold is stationary; and (b) the welfare-maximizing stationary threshold c￿ (￿) is
decreasing with ￿.
We now turn to the more realistic case that ￿ is unknown. Like all contracts, R&D
incentives must depend on things that are veri￿able. A prize or patent authority knows
whether the market niche has been ￿lled, but does not observe the hypothetical distribution
of arrival times, and does not observe the arrival of ideas that are rejected.
The length of time without arrival of a viable idea is a signal of ￿. A long period
with no arrival should make the observer more pessimistic about ￿ ￿it shifts the posterior
distribution on ￿ toward lower values. However, the posterior distribution on ￿ must also
7account for the fact that some ideas are rejected. Thus, the threshold function for accepting
or rejecting ideas is an ingredient to forming a posterior belief on ￿.
We show that, when the posterior distribution on ￿ is changing as time passes, neither
the optimized value function nor the optimizing threshold function is stationary. Because
the posterior distribution on ￿ shifts toward lower values as time passes with no viable
idea, the (optimized) value of waiting for a better idea decreases with time. This implies
that society should be less discriminating about which idea is accepted. In particular, the
preferred cost threshold is increasing instead of being stationary.
Let ~ h be the prior density function for the distribution of ￿ with support [0;1). Then
the posterior density, conditional on a threshold function c; and conditional on no viable hit



























for each ￿ 2 (0;1) (8)
The posterior depends on the threshold function c up to time ^ t; through the values of






















Lemma 1 If t1 < t2; the distribution H (￿jt1;c) stochastically dominates H (￿jt2;c). More-
over, E (￿jt;c) decreases with t.















e￿￿(^ t;c)~ h(￿)d￿ (9)























































The social value of continuing from time t is given by a function ~ V de￿ned in the ￿rst
line of (10). Substituting for V (t;c;￿) from (4) gives the expression in the second line,
which shows more explicitly the probabilities of investing at each time ^ t, as they depend on















































































to (5), the welfare-maximizing threshold function c satis￿es the following at each t:
v
r










Intuitively, ~ V is decreasing because the observer becomes more and more pessimistic about
the arrival rate of ideas as time continues without a viable hit. Because of this pessimism,
more delay is expected. Delay can be mitigated by tolerating higher cost.
In the appendix we prove the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the recipient of an idea must use it or lose it. Suppose that
the arrival rate of ideas, ￿, has a prior distribution ~ h with support [0;1). Let c be the




. Then c is increasing.
9In section 5, we discuss how the welfare-maximizing cost threshold can be implemented.
In the ￿use it or lose it￿model, the threshold is implemented by setting the reward equal to
the threshold. This is because each recipient of an idea has a single opportunity to invest.
He will not receive another idea (ideas are scarce), and he must either invest in the idea
immediately or lose it forever.
4 Use it or Bank it
When the reward is equal to the cost threshold, and therefore (with unknown ￿) increasing,
the possessor of an idea may have an incentive to delay investment to get a higher reward.
If the recipient can bank his idea for later use, the social planner needs to take this into
account in choosing his preferred cost threshold, as well as a reward policy to implement it.
How should the planner view banking? The social planner does not want to delay
investments that should be viable under his preferred cost threshold. His reward function
should ensure that this does not happen. At the same time, banking ideas for future use is
tantamount to increasing the arrival rate of ideas in the future. Since this is valuable, the
cost threshold should take it into account.
With banking, the social policy is again a threshold function c. Ideas accumulate over
time and are banked by the recipients. An idea that is converted to an innovation can either
be a banked idea or a new idea.
The marginal probability of investment at time t must be described di⁄erently according
to whether the threshold function c is increasing or decreasing at that t: If decreasing, the
banked ideas are irrelevant. Any banked idea that would be chosen at t would also have
been chosen at t ￿ dt: If there is investment at t; it is because a viable idea materializes at
that moment. On the other hand, if c is increasing at t; then banked ideas may become
viable. If c is increasing, both the banked ideas and the increasing cost threshold a⁄ect the
probability of investment at time t:
We will describe the probabilities of survival at each t by reference to Figure 1, which
shows an arbitrary cost threshold function. To describe the probability of investing in an
10tm t0(t2)t1 t2 t3 t0(t3)=0 tm t0(t2)t1 t2 t3 t0(t3)=0
Figure 1: The stochastic process with banking
idea at any t where c is decreasing, such as t1 in Figure 1, let tm be the largest value smaller
than t where c is nonincreasing. On the domain [tm;t], there are no viable banked ideas.
Let Q(tmj￿;c) be the probability of surviving to tm. Then the probability of survival to t;














This is the probability of survival to tm times the probability that no viable idea arrives in
the interval [tm;t]:
To describe the probabilities of survival at t where c is increasing, let t0 (t) be the largest
value smaller than t such that c(t0 (t)) = c(t): If there is no such value, let t0 (t) = 0:
Two such points are t2 and t3 in Figure 1. At t2; the relevant banked ideas have been
11accumulating for a shorter period of time than at t3: At t2; any ideas below the cost threshold
c(t2) that were received before t0 (t2) would have been used before t0 (t2): Therefore the
relevant banked ideas are those which accumulated between t0 (t2) and t2: At t3; there may
be relevant ideas with cost near c(t3)that accumulated very early, since there was never a
time when such high-cost ideas were below the cost threshold.
The probability of survival to t (that is, the probability that there is no viable idea by
time t) is
Q(t0 (t)j￿;c)e￿￿F(c(t))[t￿t0(t)]
This is the probability of survival to t0 (t) times the probability that no viable idea arrives
in the interval [t0 (t);t]:
Thus, if ideas are banked, the stochastic process that determines the probability of





Q(tmj￿;c)e￿￿(t;c)+￿(tm;c) if c is decreasing in [tm;t]
Q(t0 (t)j￿;c)e￿￿F(c(t))[t￿t0(t)] if c is increasing at t
(12)





F (c(t)) if c0 (t) ￿ 0
[F (c(t)) + f (c(t))(t ￿ t0 (t))c0 (t)] if c0 (t) > 0
As seen from time t; the probability of arriving at ^ t is
Q(^ tj￿;c)
Q(tj￿;c): The probability that
the ￿rst viable idea becomes available at ^ t is the probability of arriving there, times the






























is the same as in the ￿use it or lose it￿model, namely, the probability that a viable idea
occurs in the interval
￿
^ t;^ t + d^ t
￿
: But when c is increasing, the innovation may result from
a banked idea rather than from an idea that occurs in the interval
￿
^ t;^ t + d^ t
￿
. The instan-











12instantaneous probability of innovation has two parts. First is the probability that a viable






d^ t: Second is the probability that a banked
idea is called into play. When the threshold rises by c0 ￿
^ t
￿
d^ t; the probability that there is
a banked idea in the cost band c0 ￿
^ t
￿






































= B (t;c;￿) (13)
When ideas can be banked, it remains true that the welfare-maximizing cost threshold
is stationary. If the threshold is stationary, then the probability distribution Q(￿j￿;￿ c) is the
same as P (￿j￿;￿ c); so ￿ B (t;￿ c;￿) = ￿ V (t;￿ c;￿): Thus, the ￿rst-order condition is the same as
in the ￿use it or lose it￿model, namely (7). Therefore, as recorded in the next proposition,
the stationary cost thresholds are the same in both cases.3
Proposition 3 Suppose that the recipient of an idea can use it or bank it. Suppose that
the arrival rate of ideas, ￿; is ￿xed and known. Then, given ￿; the welfare-maximizing cost
threshold is stationary, has the same value c￿ (￿) as in the ￿use it or lose it￿model, and is
thus decreasing with ￿:
We now turn to the case that ideas can be banked, and the hit rate of ideas, ￿; is
unknown. The prior is again ~ h; and using the survival probabilities described in (12), the
posterior distribution on ￿ is again described by (8), substituting Q for P: The analog





decreases with ^ t.
3Banking is the same as recall in the search literature. See McCall and McCall (2008) for similar results
in search theory with and without recall. As in the ￿use it or lose it￿model, we give a di⁄erent proof, using
our social welfare function. The social welfare function is useful for understanding the case of unknown ￿:
4Lemma 1 is proved by using Claim 2 in the proof. Claim 2 applies here because, for the distribution Q;
d
dt
h(￿jt;c) = F (c(t))h(￿jt;c)[E (￿jt;c) ￿ ￿].









is de￿ned by (12) instead of (2). The social value of continuing from time t is
given by a function ~ B, which we write in two ways. The ￿rst line is the de￿nition, and the


































The welfare-maximizing c again satis￿es
v
r





The following proposition shows that the welfare-maximizing cost threshold with banking
is still increasing when the social planner is continuously updating his posterior about ￿.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the recipient of an idea can use it or bank it. Suppose that the
arrival rate of ideas, ￿, has a prior distribution ~ h with support [0;1). Let c be the threshold




. Then c is increasing.
We conclude from Propositions 1 and 2, together with Propositions 3 and 4, that it is
learning about ￿ that causes the welfare-maximizing threshold to be increasing. It is not
the banking of ideas per se.
Finally we show that optimized social welfare is higher with banking than without.
When ideas are banked, the social planner is more pessimistic about ￿ at each t for a given
c. At the same time, the arrival rate of viable ideas is higher when some of ideas may come
from the idea bank. The next proposition shows that the latter e⁄ect dominates.
Proposition 5 Let C be the set of threshold functions c that are increasing. Then for each









From (11) and (15), this proposition implies the following:
14Corollary 1 Let cV be the welfare-maximizing threshold function in the ￿use it or lose it￿
model, and let cB be the welfare-maximizing threshold function in the ￿use it or bank it￿
model. Then cV > cB:
The social planner prefers to be more selective when he can rely on banked ideas, even
if he is more pessimistic about ￿ at each t.
5 Implementing the Optimal Cost Threshold
The social planner cannot implement his preferred cost threshold directly, because the social
planner is not the recipient of the ideas. Ideas for R&D are widely dispersed within the
population of potential innovators. At best the social planner can try to implement the
threshold by setting rewards.
We suppose that the social planner sets a reward function ￿ : R+ ! R+. For example,
the reward function can represent patent policy or a prize system. The reward function ￿
implements the threshold function c if the possessor of an idea with cost c0 at time t invests
in the idea if and only if his idea satis￿es c0 ￿ c(t). In the ￿use it or lose it￿model, the
only relevant ideas are those that just arrived, but in the ￿lose it or bank it￿model, the
relevant idea might previously have been banked.
We already pointed out how to implement the cost threshold in the ￿use it or lose it￿
model. We record it formally here.
Proposition 6 Suppose that c is the welfare-maximizing cost threshold in the ￿use it or
lose it￿model. Then c can be implemented by setting ￿(t) = c(t) for all t:
Implementation is also easy whenever the cost threshold is stationary. This occurs in
both models when ￿ is known:
Proposition 7 Let c be the welfare-maximizing threshold function when the hit rate of
ideas, ￿; is ￿xed and known. Then c is stationary, and can be implemented by a reward
function that satis￿es ￿(t) = c(t) for all t: This applies in both the ￿use it or lose it￿model
15and the ￿use it or bank it￿model. In both cases, the welfare-maximizing stationary reward
decreases with ￿:
We interpret this proposition to mean that rewards should be higher when ideas are
scarce.
Implementation is not as easy in the ￿use it or bank it￿ model when the hit rate of
ideas is unknown. The intended cost threshold is increasing, which implies that the reward
must be greater than the implemented cost threshold at each t. If equal, the recipient of
a marginal idea (with cost equal to c(t)) would not invest as intended, since investing in
the marginal idea would lead to zero pro￿t. Since the reward function is increasing, the
possessor of the marginal idea might make positive pro￿t by waiting for some period until
the reward is higher. Even if the possessor of the idea might be preempted during the delay,
the expected pro￿t with delay is still larger than zero.5
We suppose that the social planner chooses a reward function ￿, and the recipients
of ideas choose investment strategies. Each recipient￿ s investment strategy is a threshold
function that indicates whether, when the opportunity arises, the possessor of the idea will
invest in the idea or bank it. The planner￿ s objective is to make sure that the privately
chosen threshold functions correspond to the threshold function that maximizes welfare as
a whole.
Each idea recipient￿ s incentive to bank or invest depends on his belief about ￿; and also
on his belief about the other agents￿investment strategies. If there is a large accumulation
of banked ideas, the probability of being preempted is high.
Further, the social planner must predict these beliefs. If the social planner does not
know the beliefs of the idea recipients, he cannot predict their investment strategies, and
thus cannot predict the cost threshold that will be implemented by his reward function.
We solve the problem of beliefs in a familiar way. We require that beliefs must be
correct in equilibrium. For the threshold function c that will be implemented, a recipient
5A similar type of tradeo⁄ exists in Weeds (2002), who considers a model of R&D competition where
delay is undermined by the fear of pre-emption.
16must believe in equilibrium that other agents invest according to c, and the recipient must
￿nd it most pro￿table to invest according to c himself. The point is to ￿nd a reward function
with this result.
The planner￿ s belief about ￿ is irrelevant in the following discussion. The planner can
implement any nondecreasing threshold he wants, provided he knows the beliefs of the
idea recipients. The idea recipients have more information than the planner, and will have
di⁄erent beliefs than the planner. This is because, when a nonviable idea arrives to a
recipient, the arrival contains information about ￿ even if the idea is banked instead of
used.
Let ^ h(￿jt;c) represent the belief of each recipient about ￿, with expected value ^ E (￿jt;c):
The argument c is a belief, namely, the recipient￿ s belief about the investment strategy
(cost threshold) of the other recipients. Our notation ^ h incorporates an assumption about
equilibrium: that in equilibrium all other recipients of ideas obey the same investment
strategy, c. We justify this assumption after de￿ning the idea recipients￿pro￿t function.












where c is the threshold function that other recipients are assumed to obey, and ^ h is the
recipients￿posterior belief on ￿: The probability of arriving at ^ t, having already arrived at















To de￿ne the idea recipient￿ s pro￿t function, suppose that he possesses an idea with
cost c0 at time t: The innovator￿ s pro￿t, as a function of the time ^ t at which he will invest,

































































































The pro￿t-maximizing investment decision at ^ t is







































In (17), ￿0 on the left hand side is the bene￿t of delay. The right hand side is the cost














The investment strategy derived in (17) is the same for all idea recipients. However,
the derivation is based on the prior assumption that all idea recipients have the same belief
about ￿: This is justi￿ed in the following Remark.
We write the following as a remark instead of a lemma because the proof in the appendix
elaborates the model, assuming that the population of idea recipients is ￿nite instead of
in￿nite, and taking limits. We do this in order to derive limit beliefs as the population
becomes large. We show that, in the limit, the beliefs of idea recipients do not depend
on when a recipient received his idea. In the limit, the probability of receiving an idea is
zero, and the timing of the idea has negligible impact beyond the impact of receiving one.
Nevertheless, the limit beliefs are more optimistic than those of the planner because the
planner has not observed the arrival of any idea at all.
Remark 1 Let c be an arbitrary nondecreasing investment strategy (cost threshold). (a) If
all recipients of ideas believe that c is the investment strategy of every other recipient, then
at a given time t; every recipient of an idea has the same belief on arrival rates, which we
18call ^ h(￿jt;c). (b) The recipients￿belief ^ h(￿jt;c) stochastically dominates the planner￿ s belief
h(￿jt;c) at every t; and as a consequence, ^ E (￿jt;c) > E (￿jt;c): (c) Every recipient of an
idea with a given cost, say c0; has the same pro￿t-maximizing investment strategy given by
(17).
The investment behavior (17) should guide the planner in choosing his reward function.
For an arbitrary nondecreasing cost threshold c, let the reward function satisfy
￿0 (t) =
￿
r + ^ E (￿jt;c)F (tjc)
￿
[￿(t) ￿ c(t)] (18)
The following lemma says that, with the reward function de￿ned in (18), idea recip-
ients will indeed obey the threshold function c that determines beliefs (represented by
^ E (￿jt;c)F (tjc)):
Lemma 2 Let c be a nondecreasing cost threshold, and suppose that the belief of each idea
recipient is c: Suppose that the reward function ￿ solves (18) at every t. Then for each
t; a recipient￿ s most pro￿table investment strategy is to invest if he has an idea with cost
c0 ￿ c(t); and not otherwise.
Proof: The condition (17) is clearly pro￿t-maximizing at the margin, for choosing
whether to invest at t or delay for a length of time dt: We must also show that if (17)
holds, a longer delay is also not pro￿table.







r + ^ E (￿jt;c)F (tjc)
￿
[￿(t) ￿ c(t)] ￿
￿









































The ￿rst line (respectively, second line) means that it is more pro￿table to invest at t
rather than t+dt (respectively, ~ t rather than ~ t+dt) because the additional pro￿t from delay
(the left hand term) is no greater than the cost of delay (the right hand term). The ￿rst




). If the idea
was not available at t (or if the possessor of the idea made a mistake by not investing), he





t < ~ t: At any time after t; the possessor of an idea with cost less than c(t) prefers to invest
rather than bank. ￿
Thus, if c is nondecreasing and the reward function ￿ is chosen to satisfy (18), recip-
ients of ideas will invest according to the investment strategy c. We therefore say that ￿
implements c if ￿ satis￿es (18) and also satis￿es ￿(t) ￿ c(t):
Proposition 8 Suppose that c is nondecreasing. There exists a reward function ￿ that
implements c. The function ￿ satis￿es ￿ > c if c is increasing. Further, ￿(t) ￿ c(t) ! 0 as
t ! 1:
Proof: Let
￿(t) = c(t) +
k ￿
R t






























The function ￿ de￿ned by (19) is a solution to (18). Since
R t
0 e￿D(^ t)c0 ￿
^ t
￿
d^ t is nondecreasing
with t; the choice of k ensures that ￿(t) ￿ c(t) ￿ 0 for all t, with strict inequality if
c is increasing on some domain. The de￿nition of k can be satis￿ed because at each t;
R t








d^ t = c(t) ￿ c(0): Since c is nondecreasing and bounded by
(v=r), there exists ￿ c ￿ (v=r) such that c(t) ! ￿ c:
It holds that ￿(t) ￿ c(t) ! 0 because
k ￿
R t













r + ^ E (￿jt;c)F (tjc)
￿ ! 0
20￿
We close this section with a comment on the pro￿tability of R&D in aggregate. Due
to the scarcity of ideas, innovators make positive pro￿t on average. This is because the
cost of an implemented idea will generally be lower than the threshold. The recipient of a
low-cost idea is in a favored position, and everyone would like to have such an idea, but
there is little that one can do to create the investment opportunity. In fact, we have taken
the extreme assumption that investment opportunities arrive entirely by chance. We have
done this to emphasize our key departure from the more standard R&D literature, where
all ￿rms have access to an investment opportunity, and pro￿t may be dissipated in a patent
race or through preemptive strategies. As a consequence, one would not expect to observe
in equilibrium that the return to R&D investments is the same as the return to capital. On
average, it should be higher.
Our argument seems to overlook the possibility that an innovator might be able to keep
his innovation secret while charging a proprietary price. This would presumably subvert the
objective of the reward, and possibly not implement the intended cost threshold. However,
as we show in our (2007) paper, at least in the case of known ￿, secrecy is never preferred
by the recipient of an idea.6 This assumes that with secrecy, another innovator can claim
the reward and end the prior innovator￿ s proprietary pro￿t stream.
6 Economic Concepts and Legal Concepts
We interpret ideas, and the fact that ideas are private, as a model of imagination or creativ-
ity. Ideas have economic value because they are scarce. We have argued that rewards should
be higher in environments where ideas are scarce. If ideas are scarce, higher cost should be
tolerated in order to reduce delay. We have also argued that rewards should be increasing
as time passes without an innovation. Longer delay leads to expectation of an even longer
delay. The delay can be mitigated with higher rewards, since higher rewards encourage in-
vestment in higher-cost ideas. Because ideas are not common knowledge, innovators make
6This result contrasts with previous treatments of secrecy in the literature. See, for example, Denicolo
and Franzoni (2004) and Erkal (2005).
21positive pro￿t in expectation.
These arguments apply equally well to patents and prizes, and any other way of giving
rewards.7 Patents raise the issue of whether our prescriptions can be implemented under
existing patent doctrine. They also raise the question of how deadweight loss incurred in
collecting the reward money changes the cost threshold that society might want to imple-
ment.
The main requirements for obtaining a patent are novelty, nonobviousness, utility and
enablement. Together, these requirements govern whether a patent is granted and the
breadth of the claims that are granted. To maximize social welfare as de￿ned in this paper,
patent grants would be more generous when ideas are scarce, or more particularly, when
the innovation arrives after long delay. Two ways of being generous are, ￿rst, to grant the
patent, and second, to grant broad claims. For the granting of a patent, a relevant doctrine
is the nonobviousness requirement. One of the secondary considerations for patentability is
￿long-felt need,￿and it seems to correspond quite closely to the problem of delay that we
have described.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(a) We ￿rst show that the optimized value of V is stationary. Stationarity of c follows from
(5).8
Claim 1 Given t1 < t2; let c1 : (t1;1) ! R+ be the function that maximizes V (t1;c;￿);
and let c2 : (t2;1) ! R+ be the function that maximizes V (t2;c;￿): Then V (t1;c1;￿) =
V (t2;c2;￿):







^ t + t2 ￿ t1
￿
(20)
7For a sample of the many ways, other than patents, that economists have thought about incentives in
R&D, see Wright (1983), chapters 2 and 8 of Scotchmer (2004) and Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006).
8Stationarity is proved in the search literature by using a value function and the Bellman equation. We
take a di⁄erent approach because V is useful when we discuss the social welfare function ~ V for unknown ￿:
22The function ~ c1 is the same function as c2; except shifted to begin at t1 instead of t2. Then
by de￿nition, V (t1;c1;￿) ￿ V (t1;~ c1;￿); and by construction, V (t1;~ c1;￿) = V (t2;c2;￿).
Hence, V (t1;c1;￿) ￿ V (t2;c2;￿):







^ t ￿ t2 + t1
￿
Then by de￿nition, V (t2;c2;￿) ￿ V (t2;~ c2;￿); and by construction, V (t2;~ c2;￿) = V (t1;c1;￿).
Hence, V (t2;c2;￿) ￿ V (t1;c1;￿). Together with V (t1;c1;￿) ￿ V (t2;c2;￿); this proves the
result. ￿
Claim 1 implies that V has a constant value. Using (5), this implies that c is also
stationary.
Part (b) follows by di⁄erentiating (7) implicitly.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The lemma follows from Claim 2. When the stochastic process is given by (2) as in section
3, and h is given by (8), the hypothesis of the Claim is satis￿ed because
d
dt
h(￿jt;c) = F (c(t))h(￿jt;c)[E (￿jt;c) ￿ ￿] (21)
Claim 2 Suppose there exists ^ ￿ such that d
dth(￿jt;c) > 0 for ￿ < ^ ￿ and d
dth(￿jt;c) < 0 for
￿ > ^ ￿. Then d
dtH (￿jt;c) > 0 at each ￿ 2 [0;1):









































d~ ￿ > 0








































d~ ￿ > 0
Therefore, H (￿jt1;c) stochastically dominates H (￿jt2;c) and (d=dt)E (￿jt;c) < 0.
237.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The conclusion that c is increasing follows from (11) since we can show that ~ V is decreasing.
























































































































￿ E (￿jt;c)F (c(t))











￿ E (￿jt;c)F (c(t))







where the last line follows from (11).
First, the optimizing function c cannot be ￿U-shaped" on any domain. If the func-
tion c is ￿U-shaped￿ on some domain, there exist t1 and t2 such that t1 < t2; c(t1) =
c(t2); and c0 (t1) < 0 < c0 (t2). However, this generates a contradiction. It holds that
￿v














; F (c(t1)) = F (c(t2));











Together with c0 (t1) < 0 < c0 (t2); this contradicts (11).
Proposition 2 then follows from Claim 3 and Claim 4 below. By Claim 4, if c maximizes




is decreasing with t on a domain (￿ t;1). Therefore, using (11), it also
holds that c is increasing on that domain. But it then follows that the entire function c
24is nondecreasing, since c cannot be U-shaped on any domain. And, in fact, c is increasing
because the derivative (22) is not constant on any interval.




. Then there exists ￿ t such
that the function t ! e￿rt ￿v
r ￿ EF (c(t))
￿
is decreasing on the domain (￿ t;1):
Proof of Claim 3: Because the optimal c cannot be U-shaped, it is either nonincreasing
or nondecreasing for su¢ ciently large t. Further, because c is bounded above and below,




































: Then there exists a









if ￿ t ￿ t1 < t2
Proof of Claim 4: We will take the domain (￿ t;1) as the domain on which e￿rt ￿v
r ￿ EF (c(t))
￿













if ￿ t ￿ t1 < t2 (23)
where ~ c is de￿ned by ~ c(t) = c(t) for t ￿ t1 and ~ c(t) = c(t + t2 ￿ t1) for t > t1.
The ￿rst inequality in (23) is true by the principle of optimality. Beginning from time









for all threshold functions ^ c; then ￿ c(t) = c(t) for every
t ￿ t1:





de￿ned by the function c restricted to (t2;1) and shifted back in time to t1. For a ￿xed
25￿; it therefore holds that V (t1;~ c;￿) = V (t2;c;￿). Further, h(￿jt1;~ c) = h(￿jt1;c) because
























r ￿ EF (c(t))
￿
is decreasing with t for t 2 (￿ t;1); V (t2;c;￿) increases with ￿.
Then (24) follows because, by Lemma 1, the distribution h(￿jt1;c) stochastically dominates
h(￿jt2;c). This means that h(￿jt2;c) puts relatively more weight on low values of ￿, where
the value of V (t2;c;￿) is low, and h(￿jt1;c) puts relatively more weight on high values of
￿, where the value of V (t2;c;￿) is high. ￿
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We show this in two claims.
Claim 5 Let c : (t1;1) ! R+ be the function that maximizes B (0;c;￿). Then c is not
increasing on any interval.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that c is increasing on a domain [0;t2]. (The same
argument works for any domain where c is increasing.) De￿ne a threshold function ~ c :













for ^ t ￿ t2
c
￿
^ t ￿ t2
￿
for ^ t > t2
Thus, the function ~ c is identical to the optimizing function c until t2, but then the function
c repeats, so that c(0) = ~ c(t2): During the period [0;t2], ideas are being banked. When
the threshold function is ~ c; the banked ideas may be useful at times ~ t > 2t2, when it holds
that ~ c(t) > c(t2) = ~ c(2t2):
We will show that B (t2;c;￿) < B (0;c;￿) < B (t2;~ c;￿); which contradicts the fact that
c is optimal from time t2: Using (13), the ￿rst inequality holds because c is assumed optimal
26and increasing, so B is decreasing. We show the second inequality.








r ￿ EF (~ c(t))
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r ￿ EF (c(t ￿ t2))
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￿











































































































































^ t + t2
￿￿











































e￿￿F(c(^ t))^ t for each ^ t 2 [0;1)
Then ~ G(tjt2) ￿ G(t) for all t; with strict inequality for t > t2; that is, the distribution








is decreasing with ^ t;
this implies that B (0;c;￿) < B (t2;~ c;￿): ￿
27Claim 6 Let c : (t1;1) ! R+ be the function that maximizes B (0;c;￿): Then c is not
decreasing on any interval.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that c is decreasing on a domain [0;t2]. (The same
argument works for any domain where c is decreasing.) De￿ne a threshold function ~ c :







^ t + t2
￿
for all t 2 [0;1)
Thus, the function ~ c is identical to the optimizing function c as c is de￿ned from t2 forward,
but it is shifted back to start at 0 instead of t2. We will show that B (0;c;￿) < B (t2;c;￿) =
B (0;~ c;￿); which contradicts the fact that c is optimal from time 0: Using (13), the ￿rst
























































= B (0;~ c;￿) ￿
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We ￿rst show in Claim 7 that the optimal c is either increasing everywhere, as we wish to
show, or there exists t1 ￿ 0 such that c is increasing for t < t1 and decreasing for t > t1:




; and if c0 (t) = 0 at some t; then c00 (t) < 0: (The
optimal c can have at most one point where c0 = 0; and at that point, c is concave.)












r + [EF (~ c(t)) ￿ c(t)]E (￿jt;~ c)F (tj~ c) (25)











> 0: If c0(t) = 0 then (d=dt)F (tj~ c) = 0 and (d=dt)[EF (~ c(t)) ￿ c(t)] = 0:






> 0 and c00 (t) < 0. ￿
Suppose, then, that there exists t1 such that for t > t1; c is decreasing and ~ B is increasing.
There are no relevant banked ideas at t1. An idea with cost c < c(t1) would already
have been used. An idea with cost c > c(t1) will never be used at any t > t1 because
c > c(t1) > c(t): Therefore, banking is irrelevant after t1; and the stochastic process
beginning at t1 is exactly the same as when ideas are not banked. Let the ￿initial￿beliefs
at t1 be ~ h1: Then, maintaining the hypothesis that c is decreasing for t > t1 (and ~ B is








for t > t1: But we already showed in
Proposition 2 that ~ V is decreasing, not increasing, which is a contradiction. This completes
the proof.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5








for every increasing threshold function c:












































































































































































￿~ h(￿)e￿￿(^ t;c)d￿ >
Z 1
0




and 1 ￿ ~ QV (￿jc) stochastically dominates 1 ￿ ~ QB (￿jc): Since g (￿) is decreasing when c is


















7.7 Proof of Remark 1
(a) Let n be the number of potential recipients. Suppose that each recipient believes that
each other recipient follows an investment strategy described by a cost threshold function
c: At date t; some recipients have received ideas. If a recipient received a single idea at,
say ~ t ￿ t; the recipient takes this into account in forming his belief on ￿. In a population

























































The limit distribution does not depend on ~ t; as asserted in part (a).
Further, the probability of receiving more than one idea has a second-order e⁄ect, and
we therefore ignore it. The numerator in the following expression is the probability of
30receiving two or more ideas by time t; and the denominator is the probability of receiving













1 ￿ e￿ ￿
nt
i ! 0
This concludes part (a).
(b) Nevertheless, the recipients are more optimistic about ￿ than the planner. When
the planner believes that c describes the recipients￿investment behavior, the density of the
























; is proportional to ￿: This implies that the
recipients, as opposed to the planner, place higher weight on higher ￿; that r stochastically
dominates h; and that r has a higher expected value. It is instructive to show the latter
directly.









































be the expected values with respect to the planner￿ s posterior
belief, and let V arh (￿) be the variance of the planner￿ s belief. Now consider the expected



































Thus, Er (￿jt;c) > Eh (￿jt;c):
Part (c) follows from (17). ￿
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